At Euronaval 2026, senior French Navy and defence officials said the service is reinforcing its core operational concepts and capabilities to meet evolving maritime threats. Speaking at the exposition’s opening conference in Paris on 2 November, they outlined how new platforms and systems align with the navy’s main missions.
Officials said these concepts are expressed through four primary operational missions, each backed by specific capability programs.
According to Alexandre Lahousse, Deputy Delegate for the Armed Forces at the Ministry of Defence’s Direction générale de l’armement (DGA), the first mission is sustaining the naval component of France’s strategic nuclear deterrent. This includes the next-generation SSBN, the four-boat SNLE-3G Invincible class, and the development and deployment of the M51.3 and M51.4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The second mission is rapid deployment to potential flashpoints to deter escalation. Naval capacity is central to this role, Lahousse said, highlighting France’s new aircraft carrier, France Libre, scheduled for delivery in 2038 under the Porte-avions Nouvelle Génération (PaNG) program. He noted there is ongoing national discussion on the possibility of a second carrier.
Lahousse also pointed to the Frégate de Défense et d’Intervention (FDI) program as a key enabler for the second mission. The class, led by FS Amiral Ronarc’h, is leveraging advanced technology against emerging threats and marks “a turning point in capability” for the fleet, he said.
Support shipping remains essential to this mission set, Lahousse added. The navy has taken delivery of two of four Jacques Chevalier-class BRF fleet replenishment tankers, with the third already afloat.
The third mission is safeguarding France’s maritime spaces, for both naval and civil-commercial interests, by deploying patrol assets in key areas. New platforms are entering service, including the first of seven Patrouilleur hauturier offshore patrol vessels, launched in February 2026.
The fourth mission focuses on maintaining information dominance. This depends on wide-area surveillance and the ability to generate precise maritime awareness and share it through effective command-and-control. Lahousse said the DGA will accelerate work on digital architectures and integrated C2 to strengthen data-driven decision-making.
Overlaying all four missions is the need to deliver capability at speed, he said. As an example, and reflecting the need to expand surveillance against maritime uncrewed threats such as uncrewed air systems, the DGA stood up a counter-UAS program within two months.
Euronaval 2026 and strategic missions
These operational priorities support the navy’s broader strategic effects. Rear Admiral Hugues Laine, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Naval Operations, said the navy’s strategic outputs are safeguarding sea lanes, projecting power, and protecting national interests.
With advances in surveillance and strike, the service is improving its ability to observe maritime activity and to detect, identify and track threats, Rear Adm Laine said.
Delivering effects at sea remains difficult due to persistent uncertainty in the maritime environment, he noted. Rear Adm Laine cited three main drivers.
First is the scale and mobility within the maritime domain. Even with military and commercial satellite constellations, continuous wide-area coverage is almost impossible, he said, and the sea offers broad freedom of maneuver. A vessel at 15 knots can cover roughly 700 nautical miles in a day, affecting areas spanning thousands of square miles between satellite passes, which “creates a dilution of actors and assets.”
Second is what he called the illusion of transparency at sea, and the way state and non-state actors exploit sensor limitations. AIS was designed for collision avoidance, not intelligence or security, so it transmits only what a ship chooses and can be switched off. Actors can also spoof identity and position. Growing commercial traffic provides cover for rogue vessels, and hydrographic or oceanographic ships can be used to mask clandestine surveillance.
Third is the inherent opacity of the underwater environment. Many sensors effective above the surface do not work below it, so navies rely on acoustics such as sonar. Performance varies with temperature, salinity and pressure, creating complex sound velocity profiles and potential dead zones where submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles can hide. In littorals, ambient noise from marine life and shipping complicates detection. This physical opacity, he concluded, favors threats and enables aggressive action below the threshold of open conflict.
In this context, emerging concepts for autonomous and uncrewed systems, highlighted in exercises such as the recent AUKUS Pillar II drill, are likely to play a growing role in how navies adapt to contested seas.