Massachusetts man convicted in Iran sanctions export case

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Pinterest
Pocket
WhatsApp
Massachusetts man convicted in Iran sanctions export case

A Massachusetts man convicted in federal court in Boston faces sentencing in October after a jury found him guilty of participating in a scheme to move advanced U.S. electronic components to Iran in violation of federal sanctions.

Prosecutors said Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi, 43, a dual U.S.-Iranian national from Natick, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and two substantive counts of violating those laws. U.S. District Judge Indira Talwani set sentencing for Oct. 13.

Court filings show Sadeghi was charged by criminal complaint in December 2024 alongside Mohammad Abedininajafabadi, also known as Mohammad Abedini, of Tehran. A grand jury later returned an indictment, followed by a superseding indictment in December 2025. Abedini remains at large.

Senior Justice Department officials said the verdict reflects ongoing efforts to enforce U.S. sanctions on Iran. According to the department, Sadeghi arranged for sensitive microelectronic parts to be sent from the United States to Iran through a European intermediary despite receiving training on sanctions and export laws.

Federal authorities in Massachusetts said the case underscores the national security risks posed by illicit transfers of high-tech components and signals that those who conspire to evade export controls will be prosecuted. The FBI described the conduct as endangering U.S. security and vowed continued efforts to pursue those who aid foreign adversaries.

Massachusetts man convicted linked to Iranian drone supplier

According to court documents, Abedini founded and manages San’at Danesh Rahpooyan Aflak Co., also known as SDRA or SADRA, an Iranian firm that builds navigation modules used in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ military drone program. SDRA’s core product, the Sepehr Navigation System, is sold to the IRGC, which the United States designated a foreign terrorist organization on April 15, 2019. The system is intended for unmanned aerial vehicles as well as cruise and ballistic missiles.

At the time of the scheme, Sadeghi worked for a Massachusetts microelectronics manufacturer identified in filings as U.S. Company 1. He also co-founded a separate Massachusetts technology business, U.S. Company 2, that develops wearable sensors for fitness and kinetic monitoring.

Prosecutors said Sadeghi and, allegedly, Abedini and others circumvented U.S. export controls by obtaining U.S.-origin parts from U.S. Company 1, then causing them to be shipped to Iran for SDRA. In or around 2016, Sadeghi traveled to Iran seeking funding for U.S. Company 2 from the Iranian National Elites Foundation. After that funding was secured, Sadeghi and others formed a second company in Iran, referred to as Iranian Company 1, which soon entered into a contract with SDRA for SDRA technology. Beginning in or around 2016, Sadeghi helped Abedini acquire export-controlled electronic components in the United States for reexport to Iran.

Because U.S. law restricts exports to Iran, Abedini set up Illumove SA in Switzerland as a front company for SDRA, according to filings. With Sadeghi’s assistance, Abedini, through Illumove, signed a contract with U.S. Company 1 to develop a product to evaluate its components, including sophisticated semiconductors. Prosecutors said Sadeghi caused U.S.-made accelerometers, gyroscopes, and inertial measurement units to be moved to Iran through Illumove for SDRA’s benefit. Some of the parts obtained through Illumove were the same types used in SDRA’s Sepehr Navigation System.

Filings further allege that Abedini provided material support to the IRGC Aerospace Force, a strategic missile, air and space branch. Since at least 2014, SDRA has worked on guided rockets and integrated navigation systems for that force. Between 2021 and 2022, approximately 99% of SDRA’s sales of the Sepehr Navigation System, which is used in IRGC one-way attack drones, were to the IRGC Aerospace Force.

On Jan. 28, 2024, three U.S. service members were killed and more than 40 others were injured in a drone attack by IRGC-backed militants on a base in northern Jordan known as Tower 22. According to court documents, analysis of a recovered drone identified it as an Iranian Shahed UAV and indicated the navigation system was manufactured by Abedini’s company.

Each count of violating, and conspiring to violate, IEEPA and the ITSR carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a fine of up to 1 million dollars. Actual sentences are set by a federal judge based on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and relevant statutes.

The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jared C. Dolan and Alathea E. Porter of the District of Massachusetts National Security Unit, and Trial Attorney Leslie Esbrook of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

Allegations contained in charging documents remain accusations. The remaining defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a separate development highlighting legal accountability, a Georgia attorney arrested on theft and forgery charges recently faced state-level criminal counts unrelated to export controls.

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Pinterest
Pocket
WhatsApp